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Afilias' specialized technology makes Internet addresses more accessible and useful through a wide range of applications, including Internet domain registry services, Managed DNS and award-winning mobile Web services.
Service Enhancements Strengthen Account Security and Transparency
DUBLIN, IRELAND - 11 June 2009 - Today Afilias, a leading provider of Internet infrastructure services, announced key feature updates to its Managed DNS Services that will enhance user account security, portfolio management, and traffic reporting.
“Afilias’ Managed DNS Services allow corporations to have world-class DNS service from a proven provider to manage traffic to their domain names with the peace of mind of 100 percent uptime, guaranteed,” said John Kane, Vice President of Corpor
Afilias Executive Vice President and CTO, Ram Mohan, delivered a keynote address at the APTLD meeting in Manile on February 23, 2009. Mr. Mohan addressed what security issues TLD operators should pay attention to in 2009.
| 2009 Cyber Security Outlook for TLD Operators|
PowerPoint presentations delivered by Ram Mohan as the keynote address at the APTLD meeting February 23 2009 addressing what security threats TLD operators should pay attention to in 2009.
|06/05/09 2:34 pm||1.75 MB|
Ram Mohan's Keynote address at APTLD Manila February 23, 2009. This clip discusses implementing .INFO's domain anti-abuse policy.
.ORG is the first open top-level domain to fight DNS hijacking using DNSSEC
DUBLIN, IRELAND - 2 June 2009 - Afilias, a global provider of Internet infrastructure services and domain name registry technology, today announced that it has successfully signed the .ORG zone with Domain Name Security Extensions (DNSSEC) on behalf of its customer, .ORG, The Public Interest Registry (PIR). The .ORG zone is being signed in a phased manner with an initial period allowing for key partners to test the signed zone.
Podgorica, Montenegro – March 16, 2009 – The .ME Registry announced today it is partnering with the Internet Systems Consortium (ISC), a non-profit which provides core Open Source Internet software and Afilias Limited, a leading provider of Internet infrastructure services, to place F-root servers at the .ME Registry data center in Podgorica, Montenegro. These servers will provide increased resilience and performance to the DNS in Montenegro.
New solution to speed adoption of DNSSEC and enhance Internet security
DUBLIN, IRELAND - 2 March 2009 - Today Afilias announced the beta launch of 1-Click DNSSECTM , an enhancement to its Managed DNS Service, that allows organizations, corporations and government agencies to enable DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) on their domains, quickly and easily. Afilias is currently accepting 'proof of concept' testing customers and expects to officially rollout 1-Click DNSSECTM as a service available to all of the Afilias Managed DNS customers later this year.
We’ve been very pleased to see Dr. Jim Galvin of Afilias writing a series of articles about DNSSEC over on Circle ID. Jim has been a long-time friend and supporter of the Deploy360 Programme and has spoken multiple times at our ION conferences. (For example, he spoke at our recent ION Belfast event.) Jim was also involved with the recent sponsorship of our ION conferences by Afilias.
Anyway, over at CircleID Jim started a series of articles about different aspects of DNSSEC. His articles thus far include:
The three articles provide a good overview of the current state of DNSSEC. His third article, in particular, dives into an issue that has not been widely discussed – the potential 5-day waiting period during the transfer or a domain between registrars.
“Looking for a quick way to explain DNSSEC to people? Would you like a DNSSEC handout you could print out and distribute at an event? Need something to send to your manager or a vendor about why it is so important to support DNSSEC?” – Internet Society
Check out Internet Society’s 2-page, easy-to-understand fact sheet on Domain Names System Security Extensions, or DNSSEC.
What is DNSSEC and why is it so important? Jim Galvin of Afilias discusses the business reasons for, and financial implications of, deploying DNSSEC: from staying ahead of the technological curve, to staying ahead of your competition, to keeping your customers satisfied and secure on the Internet.
| DNSSEC Overview|
This document provides a short overview on what DNSSEC is and how it works.
|03/02/09 11:06 am||73.54 KB|
Howard Eland Senior Director Of Content Propagation and Resolution at Afilias discusses the differences between SSL and DNSSEC.
| Securing a Domain SSL vs DNSSEC|
Howard Eland Senior Director Of Content Propagation and Resolution at Afilias discusses the differences between SSL and DNSSEC.
|03/02/09 10:01 am||87.58 KB|
Thinking of deploying DNSSEC on your TLD? Find out what to expect from the experts! Click Here to view Afilias' on-demand webinar featuring a panel discussion on implementing DNSSEC.
Many ccTLD registries are contemplating deploying Domain Name Security Extensions (DNSSEC). This Webinar will review the "lessons learned" from major players in the DNS industry who have taken a leadership position in deploying DNSSEC among TLDs and the Root infrastructure. This Webinar will give you key questions to ask yourself when deciding upon DNSSEC deployment parameters and timeline. It will also give you a good understanding of the infrastructure changes required for your registry and DNS systems to support DNSSEC.
John Kane, VP Corporate Services - Afilias
Rickard Bellgrim - .SE registry
Lauren Price - .ORG, The Public Interest Registry
Steve Crocker – Shinkuro and ICANN SSAC
Ram Mohan, CTO - Afilias
| DNSSEC RFCs|
The RFC standards that specify the core functionality of DNSSEC.
|03/02/09 10:09 am||64.18 KB|
A big security news event last night and today is that the Twitter.com Web site was hacked and content on the site replaced. TechCrunch reported it and it has been picked up globally.
But - was the Twitter.com website really hacked? We now know it was not so.
There are four ways that users typing in Twitter.com would have seen the Iranian Cyber Army page.
Hack The Web Site
First, the hackers could have compromised the machines that run the Twitter.com Web pages, and replaced that content with their own content. A few years ago, this was one of the most popular ways of hacking sites, but high traffic Web site owners these days deploy very good security measures and are quite careful about who gets access to their production servers, what software is run on them, and how quickly security holes are patched.
Frankly, there are easier ways to "hack" a Web site without actually touching the Web site itself just steal access to their e-mail accounts and get their password to their DNS administration account so you can redirect all traffic aimed at the Web site and have it go somewhere else. That is what seems to have happened , according to recent media reports.
Hack The Registrar Account
The Twitter.com domain is registered at Network Solutions, one of the oldest domain name registrars. Network Solutions hosts some of the world's top brands and has been in business since the start of the commercial domain name business. They have also been a frequent (and sometimes successful) target of hacking attempts (the most recent one I recall is the June 2009 compromise of 573,000 debit & credit cards).
If the bad guys did manage to hack into the registrar account for Twitter.com, then they would have been able to touch and control anything related to the domain name. This includes the ability to change the ownership of the domain name, technical instructions for where e-mail for Twitter.com is sent, and finally instructions for where users typing in Twitter.com should be redirected to.
This is serious stuff, of course. The ICANN Security & Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC) has been publishing advisories on this threat for years, most recently as SAC040 (available in 8 languages on the SSAC Web site), asking registrars and Web site owners to exercise care in their security practices.
Hack The Managed DNS Provider
If the registrar account was not compromised, then the hackers could have used their third and equally devastating line of attack overwhelm security on the DNS servers for Twitter.com and gain access to the Control Panel at the DNS provider.
DNS servers are a kind of automated Internet directory service which instructs your web browser or your Tweetdeck (or other API) software where to find the site twitter.com. Web sites with a lot of traffic such as Twitter often contract with specialized companies who build large scale infrastructure to ensure that users looking for the website can get the Internet directory assistance quickly and reliably using a service called Managed DNS.
A few companies (including Afilias, my employer) provide Managed DNS service. Managed DNS is an increasingly important tool that companies deploy to ensure that their web site is always accessible and highly available online. (In Twitter's case, this is provided by DynDNS).
If access to the DynDNS Control Panel did get hacked (and recent reports indicate that this might be the root cause), then it would be equally easy to redirect all traffic, with potentially little notice to Twitter. This is why I like features like user group permissions, IP address restrictions and the automatic security alert SMS feature in the Afilias Managed DNS product you need a rapid alert mechanism if your site's traffic is being hijacked.
Hack The DNS Resolver
Of course, even if the Web site was locked down tight, the registrar had world class security and the Managed DNS provider was near impregnable, it is possible to just insert spurious directory (DNS) information so that Web browsers will always be given the wrong address of the Web site.
This may sound far-fetched, but it is actually really easy to do. The core infrastructure of the Internet was built in the days when security was an afterthought, and hackers can exploit that vulnerability easily. Called a "man-in-the-middle" attack, it is most devastating when insecure wireless (WiFi) networks are taken over (imagine the free Internet at Starbucks being taken over by a rogue machine, which then controls all access to any Web site you want to go to).
In the case of twitter.com, it is unlikely that this happened the hacker would have to insert the spurious directory (DNS) information into resolvers all over the world. But such an attack is very effective within an ISP or a company that runs its own resolvers which get compromised.
Could DNSSEC Have Helped?
Some folks have already asked me if DNSSEC could have prevented Twitter.com traffic from being hijacked.
In this case, the answer is, "No". DNSSEC protects you when the correct information is in the DNS and your browser (or local resolver) validates the signed information.
But if the DNS Resolver had been hacked, only DNSSEC would have helped no other solution is 100% effective, and your browser would never go to the wrong site.
You need to practice good security. This is sometimes more an art than a science.
Below are some photos of the Global Cyber Security Center's DNS Security Eventof which Afilias' Jim Galvin was a panelist discussing DNSSEC.
| Presentation-Dr Galvin GCSC|
|07/06/10 10:56 am||240.9 KB|
Ram Mohan, Executive Vice President and Chief Technology Officer presented "Securing your DNS infrastructure using DNSSEC" at the AtLarge Summit during the ICANN Mexico City Meeting.
| Ram Mohan presentation on DNSSEC - ICANN Mexico City|
February 28 2009 - At-Large Summit ICANN Mexico City
|03/02/09 7:46 am||557.09 KB|
On November 11, 2010 Afilias secured the .ASIA TLD with DNSSEC. You can find media, presentations, and comments from the event here.
| Overview and History of DNSSEC - IETF Beijing/ .ASIA DNSSEC signing|
Afilias' Dr. James Galvin provides an overview and history of DNSSEC at the .ASIA DNSSEC press event in Beijing China Nov 11, 2010.
|11/11/10 2:03 pm||30.87 KB|
| History and Value of DNSSEC presentation|
Afilias' Dr. James Galvin provides a history and overview of DNSSEC at the .ASIA DNSSEC signing press conference at the IETF meeting in Beijing China Nov 11, 2010. (See separate document for verbal remarks)
|11/11/10 1:41 pm||702.3 KB|
| Afilias' Ram Mohan's presentation to SSAC on DNSSEC deployment and working with IANA|
Afilias' Ram Mohan's presentation to SSAC on DNSSEC deployment and working with IANA
|12/09/10 11:22 am||321.2 KB|
DNSSEC protects the DNS from cache poisoning exploits which can allow malicious entities to intercept an Internet user's request to access a website, and redirect or eavesdrop on the user without their knowledge, and with no ability to reassert control.